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Abstract
We introduce the concept of fresh data trading, in which a destination user requests, and pays for,
fresh data updates from a source provider, and data freshness is captured by the age of information
(AoI) metric. Keeping data fresh relies on frequent data updates by the source, which motivates the
source to price fresh data. In this work, the destination incurs an age-related cost, modeled as a general
increasing function of the AoI. The source designs a pricing mechanism to maximize its profit; the
destination chooses a data update schedule to trade off its payments to the source and its age-related
cost. Depending on different real-time applications and scenarios, we study both a predictable-deadline
and an unpredictable-deadline models. The key challenge of designing the optimal pricing scheme lies
in the destination’s time-interdependent valuations, due to the nature of AoI and the infinite-dimensional
and dynamic optimization. To this end, we consider three pricing schemes that exploit and understand
the profitability of three different dimensions in designing pricing: a time-dependent pricing scheme,
in which the price for each update depends on when it is requested; a quantity-based pricing scheme,
in which the price of each update depends on how many updates have been previously requested; a
subscription-based pricing scheme, in which the price for each update is flat-rate but the source charges
an additional subscription fee. Our analysis reveals that the optimal subscription-based pricing maximizes
the source’s profit among all possible pricing schemes under both predictable deadline and unpredictable
deadline models; the optimal quantity-based pricing scheme is only optimal with a predictable deadline;
the time-dependent pricing scheme, under the unpredictable deadline, is asymptotically optimal under
significant time discounting. Numerical analysis shows that the profit-maximizing pricing schemes can
also lead to significant reductions in AoI and social costs; a moderate degree of time discounting is
enough to achieve close-to-optimal time-dependent pricing scheme.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
Information usually has the greatest value when it is fresh [1, p. 56]. Data freshness is
becoming increasingly significant due to the fast growth of the number of mobile devices and the
dramatic increase of real-time systems. For instance, real-time knowledge of traffic information
and the speed of motor vehicles is crucial in autonomous driving and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Hence, it has driven the new metric to measure data freshness, namely age-of-information (AoI)
introduced in [2]. Real-time systems range from Internet-of-Things (IoT) industry, multimedia,
cloud-computing services, real-time data analytics, to even financial markets. More specifically,
examples of real-time applications demanding timely data updates include monitoring, data
analytics and control systems, phasor data updates in power grid stabilization systems; examples
of real-time datasets include real-time map and traffic data, e.g., the Google Maps Platform [7].
The systems involving these applications and datasets put high emphasis on the data freshness.
Despite of the increasing significance of fresh data, keeping data fresh relies on frequent data
generation, processing, and transmission, which can lead to significant operational costs for the
data sources (providers). Such operational costs make pricing design an essential role in the fresh
data trading interaction between data sources and data destinations (clients), as pricing provides
an incentive for the data provider to update the data and prohibits the data users (receivers)
from requesting data updates unnecessarily often. Furthermore, in addition to enable necessary
fresh data trading, pricing design is also one of the core techniques of revenue management,
facilitating data sources’ profit maximization.
The pricing for fresh data is under-explored, as all existing pricing schemes for communication
systems serve to control the network congestion level and assume that a consumer’s satisfaction
with the service depends mainly on the quantity/quality of the service received without consider-
ing its timeliness. Fig. 1 illustrates the interaction in fresh data markets between data providers
and users requesting fresh data. This paper tries to partially fill in the gap by considering a
single source-destination pair, aiming to answer the following question:
Question 1. How should the source choose the pricing scheme to maximize its profit in fresh
data trading?
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Fig. 1: Examples of potential fresh data markets.
B. Approaches and Challenges
Motivated by different types of fresh data businesses, we consider both a predictable-deadline
model and an unpredictable-deadline model. In the former case, the source and the destination
may only interact sequentially for a (potentially short-term) finite horizon (e.g. deadline-aware
cloud computing tasks [9]). In the latter case, such an interaction is relatively longer-term such
that the destination and the source may not know the exact deadline of such a fresh data business
(e.g. uncertain completion-time cloud computing tasks [10]).
For both predictable-deadline model and the unpredictable-deadline model, we study three
types of pricing schemes by exploiting three different dimensions, namely time, quantity, and
subscription, described in the following:
• The time-dependent pricing scheme: The source of fresh data prices each data update based
on the time at which the update is requested. Due to the nature of the AoI, the destination’s
desire for updates increases as time (since the most recent update) goes by, which makes it
natural to explore this time sensitivity. This pricing scheme is also motivated by practical
pricing schemes for mobile networks (in which users are not age-sensitive).
• The quantity-based pricing scheme: The price for each update depends on the number of
updates requested so far (but does not depend on the timing of the updates) [20]. One of its
advantages is that it rewards the destination by reduced prices for each additional fresh data
updates to incentivize more fresh data updates. Such a pricing scheme motivated by practical
pricing schemes for data services (e.g., for data analytics services [6] and cloud computing
services [7], [8]). For instance, the storage provider RimuHosting charges a smaller price
for each additional gigabyte of storage is purchased by the user [8].
• The subscription-based pricing scheme: The source charges an one-time subscription price
3Profit maximization (among all possible pricing schemes)
Predictable deadline model Unpredictable deadline model
Time-Dependent Pricing × Asymptotically optimal
Quantity-Based Pricing X ×
Subscription-Based Pricing X X
TABLE I: Summary of pricing comparison.
and a flat-rate usage price (instead of differentiating the price over time or quantity dimen-
sions) for each update. Such a pricing scheme is motivated by practical pricing schemes
for mobile network data plans and services [5], [12] and enjoys a low implementation
complexity as it is characterized by two parameters only.
We aim to explore these three different pricing schemes and address the following question:
Question 2. How profitable it is to exploit the time, quantity, and subscription dimensions in
the pricing design?
The nature of data freshness poses the threefold challenge of designing the above pricing
schemes. First, the destination’s valuation is time-interdependent. Specifically, the demands for
fresh data over time are interdependent due to the nature of AoI, which differs from the existing
settings (e.g., [11]–[19]). That is, the desire for an update at each time instance depends on the
time elapsed since the latest update. Hence, the source’s pricing scheme choice needs to take
such interdependence into consideration. Second, the flexibility in different pricing dimensions
renders optimization over (infinitely) many dimensions. Third, the unpredictable deadline together
with the time discounting constitutes a continuous-time dynamic programming problem and is
challenging to solve.
The key results and contributions of this paper are summarized:
• Fresh Data Market Modeling with General AoI Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper presents the first study of the source pricing scheme design in fresh data trading,
where we consider a general increasing age cost function for the destination.
• Profit Maximizing Pricing. Under the predictable deadline model, our analysis reveals that,
exploiting the quantity dimension or the subscription dimension alone can maximize the
source’s profit. On the other hand, under the unpredictable deadline model, however, only
the subscription-based pricing can achieve profit maximization.
• Effectiveness of Exploiting the Time Dimension. We showed that profitability of exploiting
the time dimension depends on both the deadline type and the time discounting. In particular,
4the optimal time-dependent pricing can be time-invariant under the predictable deadline
model (without time discounting), and hence renders exploitation of the time dimension
ineffective. On the other hand, under the unpredictable deadline model under significant
time discounting, the time-dependent pricing asymptotically maximizes the source’s profit
among all possible pricing scehmes.
• Numerical Results. Our numerical studies show that the quantity-based pricing scheme and
the subscription-based pricing may also lead to significant reductions in AoI and social costs,
incurring up to 41% of less AoI and up to 54% less social cost, compared against the optimal
time-dependent pricing scheme. In addition, we show that the time-dependent pricing can
perform close to the profit-maximizing pricing even under moderate time discounting.
Table I summarizes the key results regarding the three pricing schemes analyzed in this paper.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. In Section II, we discuss some related work.
In Section III, we describe the system model and the game-theoretic problem formulation. In
Sections IV and V, we develop the time-dependent, the quantity-based pricing schemes, and
subscription-based pricing under the predictable deadline model and the unpredictable deadline
model, respectively. We provide some numerical results in Section VI to evaluate the performance
of the three pricing schemes, and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, there have been many excellent works focusing on the optimization of
scheduling policies in terms of minimizing the AoI in various system settings (e.g., [2], [21]–
[33]). In [2], Kaul et al. recognized the importance of real-time status updates in networks. In
[21], [22], He et al. investigated the NP-hardness of minimizing the AoI in scheduling general
wireless networks. In [23], Kadota et al. studied the scheduling problem in a wireless network
with a single base station and multiple destinations. In [24], Kam et al. investigated the AoI
for a status updating system through a network cloud. In [25], Sun et al. studied the optimal
management of the fresh information updates. In [26], Bedewy et al. studied joint sampling
and transmission scheduling problem in a multi-source system. References [27] and [28] studied
the optimal wireless network scheduling with the interference constraint and the throughput
constraint, respectively. The AoI consideration has recently gained some attention in energy
harvesting communication systems (e.g., [29]–[33]) and Internet of Things systems (e.g., [34],
[35]). Several existing studies focused on game-theoretic interactions in interference channels
5(e.g., [36]–[38]). All aforementioned works did not consider the economic interactions among
sources and destinations.
More related AoI studies pertained to the economics and fresh data and information [39]–
[41]. In particular, references [39], [40] are the most closely-related works to ours. In [39],
a repeated game is studied between two AoI-aware platforms, yet without studying pricing
schemes. References [40], [41] considered timely systems in which the destinations design
pricing schemes to incentivize sensors to provide fresh updates. Different from [40], [41], our
considered pricing schemes are designed by the source, which is motivated by most practical
communication/data systems in which sources are price designers while the destinations are
myopic instead of forward-looking as we consider in this work.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model of a single-source single-destination information
update system and formulate the corresponding pricing scheme design problem.
A. System Overview
1) Single-Source Single-Destination System: We consider an information update system, in
which one source node generates data packets and sends them to one destination through a
channel. For instance, Google (the source) generates real-time Google Map data (the data packets)
and sends them to Uber (the destination).
We note that the single-source single-destination model has been widely considered in the
AoI literature (e.g., [24], [25], [29], [31], [33]). The insights derived from this model allow us
to potentially extend the results to the multi-destination scenarios.1
2) Data Updates and Age-of-Information: We consider a fixed time period of T = [0, T ],
during which the source sends its updates to the destination. We consider a generate-at-will
model (e.g., [29]–[33]), in which the source is able to generate and send a new update when
requested by the destination. Updates reach the destination instantly, with negligible transmission
time (e.g., [30]–[32]).
We denote Sk ∈ T as the transmission time of the k-th update. The set of all update time
instances is S , {Sk}1≤k≤K , where K is the number of total updates, i.e., |S| = K and | · |
1The system constraints (e.g. congestion and interference constraints) in a multi-destination model can make the joint
scheduling and pricing scheme design much more challenging, which will be left for future work.
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Fig. 2: Illustrations of AoI ∆t and two types of AoI costs f(∆t). There are two updates at S1 and S2.
denotes the cardinality of a set. The set S (and hence the value of K) is the destination’s decision.
Let xk denote the k-th update interarrival time, which is the time elapsed between the generation
of (k − 1)-th update and k-th update, i.e., xk is
xk , Sk − Sk−1, ∀k ∈ R. (1)
The following definition characterizes the freshness of data:
Definition 1 (Age-of-Information (AoI)). Age-of-information ∆t(S) at time t is [2]
∆t(S) = t− Ut, (2)
where Ut is the time stamp of the most recently received update before time t, i.e., Ut =
maxSk≤t{Sk}.
3) Destination’s General AoI Cost: The destination also experiences an AoI cost f(∆t) related
to the destination’s desire for the new data update (or dissatisfaction of stale data). 2 We assume
that f(∆t) is a general increasing function in ∆t. For instance, a convex AoI cost implies the
destination gets more desperate when its data grows stale, an example of which is f(∆t) = ∆κt for
κ ≥ 1, which exists in the online learning in real-time applications such as online advertisement
placement and online Web ranking [45]–[47]. Fig. 2 illustrates the AoI, a convex AoI cost
function and a concave AoI cost function.
4) Source’s Operational Cost and Pricing: We use c (E(xk)) to denote the source’s average
operational cost for each update, which is modeled as a non-increasing function in the average
interarrival time. This can represent sampling costs in case the source is an IoT service provider,
the computing resource consumption in case the source is a cloud computing service provider,
2As the first work considering the pricing scheme design for fresh data, we assume the benefit of receiving the data is constant,
i.e. independent of the total number of updates.
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Fig. 3: Two-stage Stackelberg game.
and transmission costs in case the source is a network operator. The average operational cost
c (E(xk)) generalizes the fixed sampling cost model in [40] and captures the sublinear speedup
assumption: the total computing cost (i.e., the consumed computing resources multiplied by the
completion time) for each task is higher under a shorter completion time [48], [49].
The source designs the pricing scheme, denoted by Π, for sending the data updates. We
consider a canonical pricing scheme in which the price for a particular update may depend on
the time of the update request and the number of previously requested updates. We denote by
Π = (pi, {pk(t)}t∈T ,k∈N) a canonical pricing scheme that exploits three dimensions: subscription,
time, and quantity. Specifically, pi is the subscription price that the destination needs to pay at the
beginning; pk(t) specifies the price of the k-th update if requested at time t. As mentioned, such
a pricing scheme is motivated by (i) the time-sensitive demand for an update due to the nature of
AoI, and (ii) the wide consideration of time-dependent, quantity-based, and subscription-based
pricing schemes in practice [5], [12]. We next define the destination’s total payment:
Definition 2 (Payment). Under a canonical pricing scheme Π, the destination’s total payment
to the source over the entire period is
P (S,Π) =
K∑
k=1
pk(Sk) + pi. (3)
In each of the following sections, we will separately consider three special cases of the
canonical Π: namely a time-dependent pricing Πt = {p(t)}, a quantity-based pricing Πq =
{pk}k∈N, and a subscription based pricing Πs = {pi, pu}k∈N.
B. Stackelberg Games
We model the interaction between the source and the destination as a two-stage Stackelberg
game, as shown in Fig. 3. Depending on different applications and the associated business, we
8categorize the interactions between the source and the destination into a predictable deadline
model and an unpredictable deadline model. We will specify the games and analyze the pricing
scheme design problems in Sections IV and V, respectively.
IV. PREDICTABLE DEADLINE MODEL
In this section, we will first formulate the problem and derive the upper bound of the source’s
achievable profit when the destination and the source are aware of the deadline T (e.g. deadline-
aware timely cloud computing [9]). We will then separately consider three special cases of the
pricing Π by exploiting different dimensions: time-dependent pricing Πt, quantity-based pricing
Πq, and subscription-based pricing Πs. We will show that existence of the optimal Πt and Πq
schemes that can maximize the source’s profit among all possible pricing schemes.
A. Problem Formulation
Before formal problem formulation, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 3 (Operational Cost). The source’s operational cost C(K) is given by
C(K) , K · c (E(xk)) = K · c (T/(K + 1)) . (4)
As (4) indicates, update policies leading to the same K incur the same source’s operational
cost. Since c(·) is non-increasing, we can show that C(K) is increasing and convex in K.
Definition 4 (Aggregate AoI Cost). The destination’s aggregate AoI cost Γ(S) is
Γ(S) ,
∫ T
0
f(∆t(S))dt. (5)
Definition 5 (Cumulative AoI Cost). We define the cumulative AoI Cost for each interarrival
time x (between two updates) as
F (x) =
∫ x
0
f(∆t)d∆t. (6)
Based on Definition 5, we have Γ(S) = ∑k∈K(K+1) F (xk). Given the aggregate AoI cost
in (5), a feasible pricing scheme Π needs to satisfies an individual rationality constraint: the
destination should be no worse off than receiving no update; otherwise, the pricing scheme
drives away the destination. Let SP(Π) be the destination’s optimal update policy in response
to the pricing scheme Π chosen by the source, which will be defined soon.
9Any pricing scheme Π needs to satisfy the individual rationality constraint:
Γ(SP(Π)) + P (SP(Π),Π) ≤ F (T ). (7)
That is, the destination should achieve a payoff at least equal to a no-update policy F (T ).
We now introduce the following Stackelberg Game to capture the interaction between the
source and the destination:
Game 1 (Source-Destination Interaction Game). The interaction between the source and the
destination involves two stages:
• In Stage I, the source decides on the pricing scheme Π at the beginning of the period, in
order to maximize its profit, given by:
Source−P : max
Π
P (SP(Π),Π)− C(|SP(Π)|), (8a)
s.t. Π ∈ {Π : (7), pi, pk(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T , k ∈ N}, (8b)
• In Stage II, given the source’s decided pricing scheme Π, the destination decides on its
update policy to minimize its overall cost (aggregate AoI cost plus payment):
Destination−P : SP(Π) , arg min
S∈Φ
Γ(S) + P (S,Π), (9)
where Φ is the set of all feasible S satisfying Sk ≥ Sk−1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |S|.
B. Social Cost Minimization and Surplus Extraction
To evaluate the performances of pricing schemes to be studied, we first consider an achievable
upper bound of the source’s profit for any pricing schemes in this subsection. Note that the
outcome attaining such an upper bound of the profit collides with the achievement of another
system-level goal, namely the social optimum:
Definition 6 (Social Optimum). A socially optimal update policy S solves the following social
cost minimization problem:
SCM−P : min
S∈Φ
C(|S|) + Γ(S). (10)
That is, the socially optimal update policy minimizes the source’s operational cost C(|S|) and
the destination’s AoI cost Γ(S) combined. We further introduce the following definitions:
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Definition 7 (Surplus Extraction). A pricing scheme Π is surplus-extracting if it satisfies
P (So(Π),Π) = F (T )− Γ(So(Π)), (11)
and So(Π) is the social optimal update policy, i.e., it solves (10).
That is, the surplus extracting pricing leads to a payment equal to the destination’s overall
AoI cost reduction, i.e., the overall AoI cost with no updates F (T ) minus the overall AoI cost
under a socially optimal update policy Γ(So(Π)). We are ready to show that the optimality of a
surplus-extracting pricing:
Lemma 1. Under the predictable model, a surplus-extracting pricing scheme (satisfying Defini-
tion 5) maximizes the source’s profit among all possible pricing schemes, i.e., corresponding to
the optimal solution to the problem in (8).
Proof: By the individual rationality constraint in (7), we have
P (So(Π),Π) ≤ F (T )− Γ(So(Π)). (12)
Hence, the source’s profit thus is
P (So(Π))− C(Ko(Π)) ≤ F (T )− Γ(So(Π))− C(Ko(Π)),
≤ F (T )−min
S∈Φ
[Γ(S) + C(K)]. (13)
Hence, if a pricing scheme achieves the upper bound in (13), it achieves the maximal profit
among all pricing schemes.
In later analysis, we will show that the optimal quantity-based pricing and the optimal subscription-
based pricing schemes are surplus-extracting for the predictable deadline case. However, the
time-dependent pricing in general is not.
C. Time-Dependent Pricing Scheme
We first consider a (pure) time-dependent pricing scheme Πt, in which the price function only
depends on the time at which each update k is requested (i.e., Sk) and does not depend on the
number of updates so far.
We derive the (Stackelberg subgame perfect) equilibrium price-update profile (ΠP,Tt ,SP,T(ΠP,Tt ))
by backward induction. First, given any pricing scheme Πt in Stage I, we characterize the
destination’s update policy SP,T(Πt) that minimizes its overall cost in Stage II. Then in Stage I, by
11
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Fig. 4: An illustrative example of the differential aggregate AoI cost function and Lemma 2.
characterizing the equilibrium pricing structure, we convert the continuous function optimization
into a vector one, based on which we characterize the source’s optimal pricing scheme ΠP,Tt .
1) Destination’s Update Policy in Stage II: We analyze the destination’s update policy under
arbitrary Πt within the fixed time period [0, T ]. Recall that K is the total number of updates and
xk defined in (1) is the k-th interarrival time.
Given the pricing scheme Πt, we can simplify the destination’s overall cost minimization
problem in (9) as
min
K∈N∪{0},x∈RK+1++
K+1∑
k=1
F (xk) +
K∑
k=1
p
(∑
j≤k
xj
)
, (14a)
s.t.
K+1∑
k=1
xk = T, (14b)
where x = {xk}k∈K(K+1) and RK+1++ is the space of (K + 1)-dimensional positive vectors (i.e.,
the value of every entry is positive).
To understand how the destination evaluates fresh data, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 8 (Differential Aggregate AoI Cost). The differential aggregate AoI cost function is
DF (x, y) ,
∫ x
0
[f(t+ y)− f(t)]dt. (15)
As illustrated in Fig. 4, for each update k, DF (xk+1, xk) is the aggregate AoI cost increase if
the destination changes its update policy from S to S\{Sk} (i.e., removing the update at Sk). We
are now ready to derive the optimal time-dependent pricing based on the differential aggregate
AoI cost in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium price-update tuple (ΠP,Tt , KP,T,xP,T) should satisfy
pP,T
(
k∑
j=1
xP,Tj
)
= DF (xP,Tk+1, x
P,T
k ), ∀k ∈ K(KP,T + 1). (16)
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We present the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A. Intuitively, the differential aggregate AoI
cost equals the destination’s maximal willingness to pay for each update. Note that given that the
optimal time-dependent pricing scheme satisfies (16), there might exist multiple optimal update
policies as the solutions of problem (9). This may lead to a multi-valued source’s profit and
thus an ill-defined problem (8). To ensure the uniqueness of the received profit for the source
without affecting the optimality to the source’s pricing problem, one can impose infinitely large
prices to ensure that the destination does not update at any time instance other than
∑k
j=1 x
P,T
j
for all k ∈ K(KP,T + 1).
2) Source’s Time-Dependent Pricing Design in Stage I: Based on Lemma 2, we can refor-
mulate the time-dependent pricing scheme as follows. In particular, the decision variables in
problem (17) correspond to the interarrival time interval vector x instead of the continuous-time
pricing function p(t). By converting a continuous function optimization problem into a vector
optimization problem, we simplify the problem.
Proposition 1. The time-dependent pricing problem in (8) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
K∈N∪{0},x∈RK+1++
K∑
k=1
DF (xk+1, xk)− C(K), (17a)
s.t.
K+1∑
k=1
xk = T. (17b)
Note that the individual rationality constraint in (7) is automatically satisfied here, as the
destination can always choose a no-update policy (i.e., K = 0) leading to a cost of F (T ) under
any Πt.
To rule out trivial cases in which there is no update at the equilibrium, we adopt the following
assumption throughout this paper:
Assumption 1. The source’s operational cost function C(K) satisfies C(1) ≤ DF (T/2, T/2).
We first focus on the convex AoI function to derive some insightful results:
Proposition 2. When Assumption 1 holds and the AoI function f(x) is convex, then there will
be only one update (i.e., KP,T = 1) under any equilibrium time-dependent pricing scheme.
We can prove Proposition 2 by induction, showing that for an arbitrary time-dependent pricing
scheme yielding more than K > 1 updates (K-update pricing), there always exists a pricing
13
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Fig. 5: Illustrations of Example 1 with a linear cost function. Combining the first interval into the third interval maintains the
payment.
scheme with a single-update equilibrium that is more profitable. The following example provides
a proof sketch for a linear AoI cost function (a special case of the convex functions):
Example 1. Consider a linear AoI cost f(∆t) = ∆t and an arbitrary update policy (K,x), as
shown in Fig. 5. For any time-dependent pricing scheme that induces only K ≥ 2 updates. We
will prove by induction that there exists a time-dependent pricing inducing K − 1 updates and
is more profitable.
• Base case: When there are K = 2 updates, as shown in Fig. 5, the source’s profit (the
objective value in (17a)) is x1x2 + x2x3−C(2). Consider another update policy (1, x′1, x′2)
where x′1 = x2 and x
′
2 = x3 +x1. The objective value in (17a) becomes x2(x1 +x3)−C(1).
Comparing these two values, we see that (1, x′1, x
′
2) is strictly more profitable than (K,x).
• Induction step: Let K ≥ n and suppose the statement that, for an arbitrary K-update
pricing, there exists a more profitable (K−1)-update pricing is true for K = n. The objective
value in (17a) is
∑K
k=1 xkxk+1 −C(K). Consider another update policy (K ′ = K − 1,x′)
where x′1 = x2, x
′
2 = x3 + x1, and x
′
k = xk+1 for all other k. The objective value in (17a)
becomes (x1 + x3)(x2 + x4) +
∑K
k=4 xkxk+1 − C(K − 1), which is strictly larger than P .
It is then readily verified that (K ′,x′) is strictly more profitable than (K,x). Based on
induction, we can show that we can find a (K ′ − 1)-update policy that is more profitable
than the (K ′,x′) policy. This eventually leads to the conclusion that a single update policy
is the most profitable.
Based on the above technique, we can show that the above argument works for any increasing
convex AoI cost function. We present the complete proof in Appendix D.
From Proposition 2, it is readily verified that the optimal time-dependent pricing scheme is:
14
Corollary 1. Under a convex AoI function f(x), there exists an optimal time-dependent pricing
scheme ΠP,Tt such that3
pP,T(t) = DF
(
T
2
,
T
2
)
, ∀t ∈ T , (18)
where the equilibrium update takes place at SP,T1 = T/2.
Corollary 1 suggests that there exists an optimal time-dependent pricing scheme that is in fact
time-invariant. That is, although our original intention is to exploit the time sensitivity/flexibility
of the destination through the time-dependent pricing, it turns out not to be very effective. This
motivates us to consider a quantity-based pricing scheme next.
We note that the above analysis in Propositions 2 and 1 relies on the convex AoI cost function
assumption. The analysis for a general AoI cost function is difficult due to the resulted non-
convexity of the problem in (1) and may lead to an equilibrium with multiple updates. However,
we will show that the optimal quantity-based and subscription-based pricing schemes are optimal
among all pricing schemes under the general AoI cost functions.
D. Quantity-Based Pricing Scheme
In this subsection, we focus on a quantity-based pricing scheme Πq, in which the price for
each update pk depends on the number of updates that the destination has requested so far, i.e.,
the update index k.
The source determines the quantity-based pricing scheme Πq = {pk}k∈N in Stage I, in which
pk represents the price for the k-th update. The payment from the destination will be Pq(K) =∑K
k=1 pk. Based on Πq = {pk}k∈N, the destination in Stage II chooses its update policy (K,x).
We derive the (Stackelberg) price-update equilibrium using the bilevel optimization framework
[51]. Specifically, the bilevel optimization problem embeds the optimality condition of the low-
level problem (the destination’s problem (9) in Stage II) into the upper-level problem (the
source’s problem (8) in Stage I). We first characterize the conditions of the destination’s update
policy (KP,Q(Πq),xP,Q(Πq)) that minimizes its overall cost in Stage II. We then substitute
such conditions into the constraint set of the source’s pricing problem in Stage I in order to
characterize the source’s optimal pricing ΠP,Qq accordingly. We use (K
P,Q,xP,Q) to denote the
equilibrium update policy, i.e., (KP,Q,xP,Q) = (KP,Q(ΠP,Qq ),x
P,Q(ΠP,Qq )).
3There exist multiple optimal pricing schemes; the only difference among all optimal pricing schemes are the prices for time
instances other than T/2, which can be arbitrarily larger than DF (T/2, T/2).
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1) Destination’s Update Policy in Stage II: Given the quantity-based pricing scheme Πq, the
destination solves the following overall cost minimization problem:
min
K∈N∪{0},x∈RK+1++
K+1∑
k=1
F (xk) +
K∑
k=1
pk, (19a)
s.t.
K+1∑
k=1
xk = T. (19b)
Note that the individual rationality constraint in (7) here is automatically satisfied, as the desti-
nation can always choose a no-update policy (i.e., K = 0) leading to a cost of F (T ). If we fix
the value of K in (19), then problem (19) is convex with respect to x. Such convexity allows
to exploit the KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions in x to analyze the destination’s optimal
update policy in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Under any given quantity-based pricing scheme Πq in Stage I, the destination’s
optimal update policy (KP,Q(Πq),xP,Q(Πq)) satisfies
xP,Qk (Πq) =
T
KP,Q(Πq) + 1
, ∀k ∈ K(KP,Q(Πq) + 1). (20)
Intuitively, the KKT conditions of the problem in (19) equalize f(xk) for all k and hence lead
to the equal-spacing optimal update policy in (20).
2) Source’s Quantity-Based Pricing in Stage I: Instead of solving both KP,Q(Πq) and xP,Q(Πq)
explicitly in Stage II, we apply the bilevel optimization to solving the optimal quantity-based
pricing ΠP,Qq in Stage I. Doing so would lead to the price-update equilibrium of our entire
two-stage game [51].
By substituting the condition (20) into the source’s pricing in (8), we obtain the following
bilevel problem:
Bilevel : max
Πq ,K,x
K∑
k=1
pk − C(K), (21a)
s.t. xk =
T
K + 1
, ∀k ∈ K(K + 1), (21b)
K ∈ arg min
K′∈N∪{0}
Υ(K ′,Πq), (21c)
where Υ(K ′,Πq) is the overall cost given the equalized interarrival time intervals:
Υ(K ′,Πq) , (K ′ + 1)F
(
T
K ′ + 1
)
+
K′∑
k=1
pk. (22)
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We are now ready to present the optimal solution to the bilevel optimization in (21):
Proposition 3. The equilibrium update count KP,Q and the optimal quantity-based pricing
scheme ΠP,Qq satisfy
KP,Q∑
k=1
pP,Qk = F (T )− (KP,Q + 1)F
(
T
KP,Q + 1
)
, (23)
K′∑
k=1
pP,Qk ≥ F (T )− (K ′ + 1)F
(
T
K ′ + 1
)
,∀K ′∈ N\{KP,Q}. (24)
Intuitively, F (T )−(KP,Q +1)F (T/(KP,Q + 1)) is the aggregate AoI cost difference between
the no-update scheme and the optimal update policy. Inequality (24) together with (23) will
ensure that constraint (21c) holds. That is, (24) is not satisfied or
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k > F (T ) −
(KP,Q + 1)F
(
T/(KP,Q + 1)
)
, then KP,Q would violate constraint (21c). On the other hand,
if
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k < F (T ) − (KP,Q + 1)F
(
T/(KP,Q + 1)
)
, then the source can always properly
increase pP,Q1 until (23) is satisfied. Such an increase does not violate constraint (21c) but
improves the source’s profit, contradicting with the optimality of ΠP,Qq . We will present an
illustrative example of the optimal quantity-based pricing in Section IV-F.
Substituting the pricing structure in (23) into (21), we can obtain KP,Q through solving the
following problem:
max
K∈N∪{0}
− (K + 1)F
(
T
K + 1
)
− C(K). (25)
To solve problem (25), we first relax the constraint K ∈ N ∪ {0} into K ∈ R+, and then
recover the integer solution by rounding. We start with transforming the integer programming
problem (25) into a continuous optimization problem as follows.
max
K∈R+
− (K + 1)F
(
T
K + 1
)
− C(K), (26)
which is a convex problem.4 We take the derivative of objective in (26) and obtain
f
(
T
K + 1
)
T
K + 1
− F
(
T
K + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Revenue
− C ′(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost
. (27)
4To see the convexity of (K+ 1)F (T/(K + 1)), note that (K+ 1)F (T/(K + 1)) is the perspective of function F (T ). The
perspective of F (T ) is convex since F (T ) is convex [45].
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We can interpret the first term as the source’s marginal revenue of K and the second term as
the source’s marginal cost of K.
To tackle integer programming problem in (25) based on the marginal revenue and the marginal
cost in (27), we define a threshold update count Kˆ satisfying
f
(
T
Kˆ + 1
)
T
Kˆ + 1
− F
(
T
Kˆ + 1
)
≥ C ′(Kˆ), (28a)
f
(
T
Kˆ + 2
)
T
Kˆ + 2
− F
(
T
Kˆ + 2
)
< C ′(Kˆ + 1). (28b)
Note that Assumption 1 leads to the existence of a unique Kˆ satisfying (28) and the convexity
of the objective in (26) ensures that values other than these two candidates (Kˆ and (Kˆ + 1))
are not optimal to the problem in (25). Therefore, the threshold count Kˆ and (Kˆ + 1) serves as
candidates for the optimal update count to the problem in (25) as shown next.
Proposition 4. The optimal update count KP,Q to problem in (21) satisfies
KP,Q = arg min
K∈{Kˆ,Kˆ+1}
(K + 1)F
(
T
K + 1
)
+ C(K). (29)
After obtaining KP,Q, we can construct an equilibrium pricing scheme based on Proposition
3. An example optimal quantity-based pricing is
pP,Qk =

0, if k = 0,
F (T )− (k + 1)F ( T
k+1
)−∑k−1j=1 pP,Qq (j) + , if 1 < k < KP,Q,
F (T )− (KP,Q + 1)F ( T
KP,Q+1
)−∑KP,Q−1j=1 pP,Qq (j), if k ≥ KP,Q.
(30)
where  > 0 is an infinitesimal value to ensure (24).
Fig. 6 presents an illustrative example of (30). In Fig. 6 (up), the marginal revenue intersects
with the marginal cost in (27) at around K = 3.3. Hence, the threshold update count is Kˆ = 3
based on (28), and we can further verify based on (29) that the optimal update count is KP,Q = 3.
In Fig. 6 (down), we present the equilibrium quantity-based pricing scheme described in (30).
As we can see, the optimal price drops until the third update. The relatively high prices value
of the first two update prices are to ensure (24) holds for K ′ = {1, 2} while the relatively lower
price since the third update is to ensure (23) holds.
In the following, we will show that the optimal quantity-based pricing scheme in fact profit-
maximizing among all possible pricing schemes. To see this, note that the optimal update count
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Fig. 6: An illustrative example of the equilibrium quantity-based pricing scheme in (30). The destination’s AoI cost is f(∆t) =
∆2t and the source’s operational cost is C(K) = 1/6K2.
in (29) is socially optimal as it is equivalent to the SCM-P Problem in (10). From Lemma 1,
the following is readily verified:
Theorem 1 (Surplus Extraction). The optimal quantity-based pricing ΠP,Qq is surplus extracting,
i.e., it achieves the maximum source profit among all possible pricing schemes.
Theorem 1 implies that the quantity-based pricing scheme is already one of the optimal pricing
schemes. Intuitively, regardless of the pricing choice, the destination’s payment is always upper-
bounded by the AoI cost reduction as we discussed in Proposition 1. Meanwhile, the optimal
quantity-based pricing in (24) attains such a bound, based on which we prove it is profit-
maximizing. Hence, even without exploiting the time flexibility explicitly, it is still possible to
obtain the optimal pricing structure, which again implies that utilizing time flexibility may not
be not necessary.
E. Subscription-Based Pricing
In this subsection, we consider a subscription-based pricing Πs = {pi, pu} ∈ R2+, where pi is
a one-time subscription price and pu corresponds to a (fixed-rate) usage price for each update.
That is, for a update policy with K updates, the total payment from destination is pi + K · pu.
Compared to the quantity-based pricing and the time-dependent pricing, such a pricing scheme
enjoys a low implementation complexity as it is characterized by two variables only.
Recall that the surplus-extracting pricing (in Definition 7) leads to a socially optimal update
policy. Hence, the key idea of constructing the subscription-based pricing is to set pu to induce
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socially optimal update policy and then charges the maximal pi that satisfies the individual
rationality constraint in (7). It follows:
Proposition 5. Let Ko be the socially optimal number of updates (i.e., solving the SCM-P
Problem in (10)). There always exists a subscription-based pricing that corresponds to the
optimal quantity-based pricing such that
piP,S = F (T )− (KP,S + 1)F
(
T
KP,S + 1
)
− c(xo)KP,S, (31a)
pP,Su = c(x
o). (31b)
Before discussing the reason why the pricing scheme in (31) can achieve the maximal profit,
we first note that the optimal subscription pricing is a special case of the optimal quantity-based
pricing. We construct an equivalent quantity-based pricing (yielding the same source’s profit)
satisfying Proposition 3, Πˆq = {pˆk}k∈N via
pˆk =
p
P,S
u + pi
P,S, if k = 1,
piP,S, otherwise.
(32)
Substituting (32) into Proposition 3, we see that Πˆq is the optimal quantity-based pricing. By
Theorem 1, we now have:
Corollary 2 (Surplus Extraction). The optimal quantity-based pricing ΠP,Sq in (31) achieves the
maximum source profit among all possible pricing schemes.
Although the optimal subscription-based pricing scheme corresponds to a special case of the
optimal quantity-based pricing scheme under the predictable deadline model, it is not the case
in the unpredictable deadline model, as we will analyze in Section V-E.
F. Summary
To summarize our key results in this section, we graphically compare the AoI costs and the
revenues under three studied pricing schemes in Fig. 7 under a convex AoI cost. As in Fig.
7(a), the optimal time-dependent pricing scheme generates a revenue for the source equal to the
corresponding differential aggregate AoI cost (Lemma 2); it induces a unique update at T/2
(Proposition 2). We present the results regarding the optimal quantity-based pricing and the
subscription-based pricing in Fig. 7(b), since the optimal subscription-based pricing corresponds
20
(a) Optimal time-dependent pricing (b) Optimal quantity-based pricing and
subscription-based pricing
Fig. 7: Performance comparison in terms of the AoI cost and the revenue under a convex AoI cost.
to a special case of the optimal quantity-based pricing, as shown in (32). The generated revenue
equals the difference of the aggregate AoI costs under a no-update policy and a socially optimal
update policy. Finally, both the optimal quantity-based pricing and the subscription-based pricing
are surplus extracting (Theorem 1 and Corollary 2) and thus maximize the source’s profit among
all possible pricing schemes (Lemma 1).
V. UNPREDICTABLE DEADLINE MODEL
We now analyze the unpredictable deadline model, in which the source’s and the destination’s
valuations and costs are discounted over time. Specifically, the source’s and the destination’s
decisions account for time discounting: the tendency of source and destination to discount
payments and costs as they approach a temporal horizon in the future [44]. Such time discounting
effect renders analysis more challenging, since the destination and the sources’ problems become
continuous-time dynamic programs.
We aim at designing three pricing schemes and compare their performances, and we will show
that they will behave differently compared with the predictable deadline model. We start with
the corresponding surplus-extracting pricing scheme in the following subsection.
A. Problem Formulation
The analysis in the unpredictable deadline model is significantly different from that in the
predictable deadline model, mainly due to the time discounting effect. To characterize the time
discounting effect, we denote by δ the discount coefficient, which corresponds to the probability
of the system continuing after each unit of time. Specifically, the effective monetary quantity
that concerns the source and the destination is the discounted payment, given by
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Definition 9 (Discounted Payment). The discounted payment Pδ(S,Π) is
Pδ(S,Π) , pi +
∞∑
k=1
δSkpk(Sk). (33)
Similarly, the source’s and destination’s effective costs are discounted operational cost Cδ(S)
and discounted aggregate AoI cost Γδ(S), given by
Definition 10 (Discounted Operational Cost). The source’s discounted operational cost is
Cδ(S) ,
K∑
k=1
δSkc(Ej(Sj − Sj−1)). (34)
Definition 11 (Discounted Aggregate AoI Cost). The destination’s discounted aggregate AoI
cost Γ(S) is
Γδ(S) ,
∫ ∞
0
δtf(∆t(S))dt. (35)
The individual rationality constraint in pricing scheme design is then given by:
Γδ(SU(Π)) + Pδ(SU(Π),Π) ≤ Γδ(∞), (36)
where SU(Π) is the destination’s optimal update policy to be defined soon.
Game 2 (Source-Destination Interaction Game). The source and the destination interact in the
following two stages:
• In Stage I, the source determines the pricing scheme function Π at the beginning of the
period, in order to maximize its discounted profit as follows:
Source−U : max
Π
Pδ(SU(Π),Π)− Cδ(|SU(Π)|), (37a)
s.t. Π ∈ {Π : (36), pi, pk(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T , k ∈ N}. (37b)
• In Stage II, the destination decides its update policy to minimize its discounted aggregate
AoI cost plus discounted payment:
Destination−U : SU(Π) = arg min
S∈Φ
Γδ(S) + Pδ(S,Π). (38)
B. Social Cost Minimization and Surplus Extraction
In this subsection, we present the socially optimal update policy and the surplus-extracting
profit as a upper bound for the source’s achievable profit.
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We start with defining the Discounted Social Cost Minimization (SCM-U) problem as follows:
SCM−U : min
S
[
Fδ(S1) + lim
K→∞
K∑
k=1
δSk [Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk) + c (Ej≥1(Sj − Sj−1))]
]
(39a)
s.t. Sk ≥ Sk−1, ∀k ∈ N. (39b)
The SCM-U Problem is a continuous-time dynamic programming problem, which can be tackled
by breaking into a sequence of decision steps over time. To do so, we let Vc denote the minimal
social cost (the minimal objective value of the SCM-U Problem) and introduce the following
result towards solving the SCM-U Problem:
Lemma 4. The minimal social cost Vc satisfies
Vc = min
Sk≥Sk−1
[
Fδ(Sk − Sk−1) + δSk−Sk−1c(Sk − Sk−1) + δSk−Sk−1Vc
]
. (40)
Lemma 4 implies that the decision faced at t = S1 is similar to the decision at t = 0, which
implies that Sk+1 − Sk = Sk − Sk−1 for all k ∈ N, i.e., the socially optimal update policy has
equal spacing. We now have:
Proposition 6. The social cost minimizing policy So is
Sok = kx
o, ∀k ∈ N, (41)
where xo is the socially optimal interarrival time satisfying∫ xo
0
(1− δt)f ′(t)dt = ln(δ−1)[c(xo)− (1− δxo)c′(xo)]. (42)
We present the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix L. Finally, we can derive the upper bound
for source’s profit analog to the predictable case:
Definition 12 (Surplus Extraction). A pricing scheme Π is surplus-extracting if it satisfies
Pδ(So(Π),Π) = Fδ(∞)− Γδ(So(Π)), (43)
and So(Π) is socially optimal, i.e., solves (39).
To ensure Fδ(∞) in (58) to be finite, we adopt the following assumption throughout the rest
of this paper:
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Assumption 2. There exists parameters A, ζ, γ satisfying A < ∞, ζδ ≤ γ < 1, and f(t) ≤
Aζt, ∀t ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 prevents δtf(t) from diverging to ∞. It is satisfied by many classes of AoI
functions including concave AoI functions and polynomial AoI functions (as in [25]). Assump-
tion 2 further ensures that Fδ(∞) is finite, since Fδ(∞) =
∫∞
0
δtf(t)dt ≤ A ∫∞
0
(δζ)tdt =
A/ ln((δζ)−1). We now have:
Lemma 5. When Assumption 2 is satisfied, a surplus-extracting pricing scheme is the optimal
pricing among all possible pricing schemes under the unpredictable deadline model.
We prove Lemma 5 in Appendix K, which is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
C. Time-Dependent Pricing Scheme
In this subsection, we study the time-dependent pricing scheme Πt = {p(t)}t≥0 under the
unpredictable deadline model. Based on our analysis of the time-dependent pricing under the
predictable deadline model, we derive an equilibrium condition. Although the time-dependent
pricing scheme is also not surplus-extracting and the corresponding optimization is difficult to
solve, we present a suboptimal solution and show its asymptotic surplus-extraction.
1) Equilibrium Condition: Recall the time-dependent pricing design under the predictable
deadline model is based on the differential AoI cost. We next introduce the similar result for
the unpredictable deadline, analog to Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. Any equilibrium price-update pair (ΠU,Tt ,SU,T) should satisfy
pU,T
(
SU,Tk
)
=Fδ(S
U,T
k+1 − SU,Tk−1)− Fδ(SU,Tk − SU,Tk−1)− δS
U,T
k −SU,Tk−1Fδ(S
U,T
k+1 − SU,Tk ), ∀k ∈ N.
(44)
The intuition is similar to the optimal time-dependent pricing scheme, i.e., the right hand side
of (44) equals the destination’s maximal willingness to pay. For all time instances other than
SU,Tk for all k, the source can impose infinitely large prices to ensure that the destination does
not update at any of these time instances.
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Algorithm 1 Dinkelbach Method to solve (46)
1: Initialize the number of samples M , the lower bound QL, the upper bound QH, and a
tolerance parameter ;
2: Set the iteration count n = 0;
3: while |QH −QL| ≥  do
4: Set n = n+ 1;
5: Set Q[n] = QH+QL
2
;
6: Generate a sequence of XT , {kx˜(Q[n])M }k∈{1,2,...,M};
7: Set x[n] = arg maxx∈XT L(x,Q[n]);
8: if L(x[n], Q[n]) > 0 then
9: Set QL = Q[n];
10: else
11: Set QH = Q[n];
12: end if
13: end while
Lemma 6 enables us to reformulate time-dependent pricing scheme into the following continuous-
time dynamic programming problem:
max
S
∞∑
k=1
δSk−1 [Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk−1)− Fδ(Sk − Sk−1)]− δS−1Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk)− δSkc(E(Sj − Sj−1))
s.t. Sk ≥ Sk−1, ∀k ∈ N. (45)
Solving problem (45) requires us to analytically derive the value function, which is challenging.
This motivates us to consider a suboptimal time-dependent pricing scheme next.
2) Suboptimal Time-Dependent Pricing and Algorithm: Motivated by the fact that the surplus-
extracting pricing scheme in Definition 12 is equal-spacing, we will next search for a (suboptimal)
equal-spacing time-dependent pricing scheme by solving the following problem:
max
x≥0
Fδ(2x)− (1 + δx)Fδ(x)− δxc(x)
1− δx . (46)
In (46), the scalar variable x denotes the interarrival time between each adjacent updates and
we derive the discounted profit based on Lemma 6. The problem in (46) is much more tractable
than (45) since it only requires one-dimensional optimization.
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To solve the above problem in (46), we will adopt the fractional programming technique in
[52] by introducing the following problem:
max
x≥0
L(x,Q) , Fδ(2x)− (1 + δx)Fδ(x)− δxc(x)−Q(1− δx). (47)
Let Q? be the maximal objective value of (46). By [52], Q? and the optimal solution x?t to the
problem in (46) should satisfy
max
x
L(x,Q?) = 0 and x?T = arg max
x≥0
L(x,Q?). (48)
It is readily verified that maxx L(x,Q) is decreasing in Q, which implies that we can adopt the
bisection search for Q? once we can solve the problem in (47) for every Q > 0. Therefore, to
obtain x?T , we first fix Q and solve the problem in (47), and then search for Q satisfying (48).
Although the problem in (47) is non-convex, a brute-force one-dimensional search with time
complexity of O(M) in fact leads to the close-to-optimal solution to problem (47). This is
because L(x,Q) is Lipschitz continuous in x and the optimal solution is smaller than a finite
value, to be shown next.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the above procedure. Lines 5 and 8-12 perform the bisection search
for Q? and Line 7 performs the brute-force search for the optimal solution to (47).
To show the optimality of Algorithm 1 in terms of solving (47), we define x¯ , argx{
∫ x
0
δt[f(x+
t)− f(t)]dt = c(x)}5 as the zero-profit interarrival time, i.e., yielding a zero objective value of
(46). We further define
x˜(Q) , x¯+ logδ
(
Q ln((δζ)−1)
1 +Q ln((δζ)−1)
)
+ logδ(δ ·max(1, ζ)). (49)
We are ready to present the following result showing that the objective value loss of (47)
diminishes in M (the number of samples in Algorithm 1):
Proposition 7. Algorithm 1 in Line 7 yields an solution x[n] to the problem in (47) such that
max
x≥0
L(x,Q[n])− L(x[n], Q[n]) ≤ LL(Q[n])x˜(Q[n])
2M
,
where LL(Q[n]) , 4 maxt≥0[δtf(t)] + Lc +Q ln(δ−1) is the Lipschitz constant of L(x,Q).
We present the proof of Proposition 7 in Appendix M. Proposition 7 ensures that, Algorithm 1
generates an (approximately) optimal solution x[n] to (47) with an O(1/M) objective value loss
5Note that x¯ is uniquely defined since (i)
∫ x
0
δt[f(x+ t)− f(t)]dt is continuous and increasing in x, (ii) c(x) is continuous
and non-increasing in x, (iii)
∫ x
0
δt[f(x+ t)− f(t)]dt = 0 when x = 0 and limx→∞
∫ x
0
δt[f(x+ t)− f(t)]dt→∞.
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for every Q[n]. The proof of Proposition 7 involves showing that the existence of the optimal
solution to (47) in [0, x˜(Q)] and the Lipschitz continuity of L(x,Q) in x.
Finally, from Lemma 6, the equal-spacing time-dependent pricing scheme Π˜t = {p˜(t)}t≥0
based on the optimal solution to the problem in (47) is
p˜ (t) =
Fδ(2x
?
t )− (1 + δx?t )Fδ(x?t ), if t = kx?, k ∈ N,
+∞, otherwise.
(50)
3) Asymptotic Surplus-Extraction: We next study how profitable such a suboptimal time-
dependent pricing can be, through the following proposition:
Proposition 8. The equal spacing time-dependent pricing is asymptotically surplus-extracting
as δ → 0.
We present the proof of Proposition 8 in Appendix N. Proposition 8 shows that the suboptimal
time-dependent pricing scheme is in fact close-to-optimal among all pricing schemes when δ is
small enough. Hence, it implies that exploiting time dimension is profitable when the source and
the destination are “impatient”, even though the time-dependent pricing scheme is not effective
in the predictable deadline model.
D. Quantity-Based Pricing Scheme
In this subsection, we consider the quantity-based pricing scheme Πq, i.e., instead of differ-
entiating the prices across time, the price for each update change as destination requests more.
We will study whether such the optimal quantity-based pricing is still surplus-extracting as it is
in the predictable deadline model. We commence with the destination’s update policy analysis.
1) Destination’s Update Policy in Stage II: To characterize the destination’s update policy
under an arbitrary quantity-based pricing scheme Πq, we consider the following lemma:
Lemma 7. The destination’s optimal update policy SU,Q satisfies that
lim
K→∞
K∑
j=k
δS
U,Q
j
[
pj + Fδ(S
U,Q
j+1 − SU,Qj )
]
=
1
ln(1/δ)
fδ(S
U,Q
k − SU,Qk−1), ∀k ∈ N. (51)
We present the proof of Lemma 7 in Appendix O. Intuitively, Lemma 7 implies that, for each
update, the destination selects the interarrival time to balance the discounted cumulative AoI
cost and the delay of the future overall cost.
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Fig. 8: An illustrative example of (a) the optimal quantity-based pricing ΠU,Qq and (b) the equilibrium update policy SU,Q.
We may use the terminology of dynamic programming to interpret the result in Lemma 7.
Eq. (51) implies that there exists a value function Vq(Πq), i.e., the minimal destination’s overall
cost, having the following recurrent form:
Vq(Π˜q,k−1) = min
Sk≥Sk−1
[Fδ(Sk − Sk−1) + δSk−Sk−1(pk + Vq(Π˜q,k))], ∀k ∈ N, (52)
where Π˜q,j , {p˜k,j}k∈N satisfies p˜k,j = pk+j for all k and all j.
The optimal destination update policy SU,Q to (52) satisfies6
fδ(S
U,Q
k − SU,Qk−1) = ln(δ−1)δS
U,Q
k −SU,Qk−1(pk + Vq(Π˜q,k)), ∀k ∈ K. (53)
Note that it is difficult to obtain the exact form of the destination’s value function in (52).
However, we will show that the optimality condition in Lemma 7 is sufficient for designing the
optimal quantity-based pricing, as we will show next.
2) Source’s Pricing Design in Stage I: Based on the destination’s update policy in Lemma
7, we can transform the source’s pricing problem in (37) into the following form:
max
S
1
ln(δ−1)
fδ(S1)− lim
K→∞
K∑
k=1
δSk [Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk) + c(E(Sj+1 − Sj))] (54a)
s.t. Sk ≥ Sk−1, ∀k ∈ N, (54b)
which leads to the destination’s equilibrium update policy SU,Q(ΠU,Qq ). Solving the problem in
(54) leads to the optimal quantity-based pricing ΠU,Qq = {pU,Qk }k∈N based on Lemma 7, i.e.,
pU,Qk =
1
ln(δ−1)
f(SU,Qk − SU,Qk−1)− Fδ(SU,Qk+1 − SU,Qk )−
1
ln(δ−1)
fδ(S
U,Q
k+1 − SU,Qk ), ∀k ∈ N. (55)
6Note that we can relax the constraint Sk ≥ Sk−1 in (52), since there always exists a unique Sk ≥ Sk−1 satisfying (53) for
any arbitrary Sk−1.
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In the following, we analytically solve the problem in (54). From (54), we observe that the
discounted social cost (defined in (39)) appears in the source’s objective in (54). Based on such
an observation, we can derive the following result towards solving the problem in (54):
Lemma 8. The update policy SU,Q that is optimal to the problem in (54) should satisfy
SU,Qk =
arg maxSk≥0
[
1
ln(δ−1)fδ(Sk)− δSk(c(xo) + Vc)
]
, if k = 1,
Sok−1 + S
U,Q
1 , otherwise,
(56)
where So is the social cost minimizing policy (the optimal solution to (39)) and Vc is the minimal
discounted social cost defined in Lemma 4.
To understand Lemma 8, the update policy after the first update (i.e., {Sk}k≥2) is to minimize
the discounted social cost. Hence, the interarrival time SU,Qk+1 −SU,Qk for all k ≥ 1 is equal to xo.
Combining Lemma 8 and (55), we are ready to characterize the optimal quantity-based pricing:
Proposition 9. The optimal quantity-based pricing scheme in (55) is
pU,Qk =

1
ln(δ−1)(f(S
U,Q
1 )− fδ(xo))− Fδ(xo), if k = 1,
c(xo), otherwise.
(57)
Intuitively, the price after the first update is set to c(xo). This ensures that the destination’s
update policy in Stage II after the first update is exactly the same as the socially optimal update
policy in Proposition 6.
We illustrate the price-update equilibrium in Lemma 8 and Corollary 9 under the optimal
quantity-based pricing in Fig. 8. As shown in Fig. 8(a), the source charges a relatively high
price for the first update, while charging relatively low prices for the remaining updates. As
illustrated in Fig. 8(b), such a pricing scheme leads to a larger interarrival time from (53)
compared to the later interarrival times.
E. Subscription-Based Pricing Scheme
We finally present the subscription-based pricing Πs = {pu, pi} ∈ R2+. In particular, pu is the
flat-rate usage price per update and is charged whenever the destination requests a data update;
pi is the subscription price and is charged at time t = 0. Hence, the discounted payment paid by
the destination to the source is Pδ(S) = pi + limK→∞
∑K
k=1 δ
Skpu. We note that, different from
the predictable deadline model, the subscription-based pricing does not correspond to a special
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case of the quantity-based pricing scheme under the unpredictable deadline here, since in the
latter case, the source does not charge a fixed payment at t = 0. In contrast, in the predictable
deadline model, the source and the destination are insensitive to when the payment is made.
We will show that derive the optimal subscription-based pricing and show it is surplus-
extracting, i.e., achieving the maximal source’s profit among all possible pricing schemes:
Proposition 10. The optimal subscription-based pricing ΠU,Ss = {pU,Su , piU,S} is
pU,Su = c(x
o) and piU,S = Fδ(∞)− Vc, (58a)
where xo is the socially optimal interarrival time defined in Proposition 6 and Vc is the minimal
social cost defined in Lemma 4. In addition, the optimal subscription-based pricing is surplus-
extracting (Definition 12).
In (58), Fδ(∞) is the discounted aggregate cost of no data update, and c(xo) under the pricing
scheme in (58) serves to align the destination’s interest to minimizing the social cost in (39).
Under the pricing in (58), the destination’s problem becomes
min
S∈Φ
lim
K→∞
[
piU,S +
K∑
k=1
δSkc(E(Sj − Sj−1)) +
K∑
k=0
δSkFδ(Sk+1 − Sk)
]
=Fδ(∞)− Vc + minS∈Φ limK→∞
[
Fδ(S1) +
K∑
k=1
δSk(Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk) + c(E(Sj − Sj−1)))
]
= Fδ(∞).
(59)
The destination’s discounted payoff in (59) is Fδ(∞), equal to the its discounted payoff if it
does not request any update (i.e., not subscribing to the pricing scheme). This indicates that the
destination will not be worse off by requesting updates (i.e., satisfying the individual rationality
constraint in (36)). The problem in (59) leads to the same optimal solution to the social cost
minimization in (39), hence it corresponds to a surplus extracting pricing scheme according to
Definition 12. Hence, from Lemma 5, and the optimal subscription-based pricing in (58) is the
optimal among all possible pricing schemes.
Combining the results in Corollary 2 and Proposition 10, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3. The subscription-based pricing is the optimal pricing under both predictable
deadline and unpredictable deadline models.
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(a) Time-Dependent Pricing (b) Quantity-Based Pricing (c) Subscription-Based Pricing
Fig. 9: Performance comparison in terms of the discounted AoI cost and the discounted revenue.
F. Summary
Finally, we summarize our key results in this section through graphically comparing the
discounted AoI costs and the discounted revenues under three studied pricing schemes in Fig.
9. Fig. 9(a) presents the equal-spacing time-dependent pricing scheme, where the discounted
revenue is derived based on Lemma 6. Fig. 9(b) presents the discounted revenue of the optimal
quantity-based pricing scheme based on Lemma 7 and the fact that 1
ln(δ−1)fδ(S1) =
∫∞
S1
[fδ(t) +
ln(δ)δtf ′(t)]dt. In addition, the optimal quantity-based pricing (in Lemma 8 and (53)) charges
a relatively high price for the first update, while relatively low prices for the remaining updates,
leading to a pricing scheme leads to a large first interarrival time from (53). Finally, Fig. 9(c)
presents the optimal subscription-based pricing, which is surplus-extracting (Proposition 10) and
hence the optimal pricing scheme among all possible pricing schemes (Lemma 5). The optimal
subscription-based pricing induces an equal-spacing update policy as shown in Fig. 9(c), which
is consistent to Proposition 6. Finally, comparing the discounted revenues generated by three
pricing schemes in Fig. 9 (a)-(c), we observe that the revenue of the optimal subscription-based
pricing generates more revenue than the suboptimal time-dependent pricing scheme and the
optimal quantity-based pricing scheme do.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we perform simulation results to numerically compare all proposed pricing
schemes. We then evaluate significance of performance gains of the profit-maximizing pricing
and the impacts of the time discounting and the destination’s sensitivity on their performances.
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Fig. 10: Performance comparison in terms of (a) the discounted AoI and the discounted AoI cost, and (b) discounted profit,
payment, and social cost. The error bars represent the standard deviations.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider a convex power AoI cost function: f(∆t) = ∆κt , where the coefficient κ ≥ 1 is
termed the destination’s age sensitivity. Such an AoI cost function is useful for online learning due
to the recent emergence of real-time applications such as advertisement placement and online web
ranking [25], [46], [47]. Hence, the cumulative AoI cost function F (t) is F (t) = tκ+1/(κ+ 1).
The source has a constant operational cost, i.e., c(E(xk)) = c, where c is the source’s operational
cost coefficient. Let κ follow a normal distribution N (1.5, 0.2) truncated into the interval [1, 2];
let c follow a normal distribution N (50, 20) truncated into the interval [0, 100]. Our simulation
results take the average of 100,000 experiments.
B. Results for the Predictable Deadline Model
1) Performance Comparison: We compare the performances of three pricing schemes, the
optimal time-dependent pricing (TDP), the optimal quantity-based pricing (QBP), and the optimal
subscription-based pricing (SBP), together with a no-update (NU) benchmark. We will show that
the profit-maximizing pricing schemes (the TDP and the QBP) can lead to significant profit gain
compared against the benchmarks (the TDP and the NU). In Fig. 10(a), we first compare four
schemes in terms of the aggregate AoI and the aggregate AoI cost. The NU scheme incurs a
much larger aggregate AoI than all three proposed pricing schemes. Moreover, as indicated by
Proposition 6, the QBP and the SBP achieve the same performance, incurring an aggregate AoI
that is only 59% of that incurred by the optimal TDP. In terms of the aggregate AoI cost, we
observe a similar trend.
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Fig. 11: Impact of destination’s age sensitivity κ on the aggregate AoI and the AoI cost.
In Fig. 10(b), we compare four schemes in terms of the social cost and the source’s profit.
First, we observe that the optimal QBP and the optimal SBP are 27% more profitable than the
optimal TDP. Finally, the optimal TDP only incurs 34% of the social cost of the NU scheme. The
optimal QBP and SBP further reduce the social cost and incurs only 46% of that of the optimal
TDP. Note that the large standard deviations for both profits and payments of the proposed
pricing schemes are mainly due to the large standard deviation of the aggregate AoI cost for the
NU scheme, as shown in Fig. 10(a). Therefore, the profit-maximizing pricing schemes (the TDP
and the QBP) can significantly outperform the benchmarks in terms of the aggregate AoI cost
and the social cost.
2) Impact of Age Sensitivity: Fig. 11(a) compares the performances of four schemes at
different age sensitivity κ, which characterizes how the destination is sensitive to the AoI. First,
the QBP, the TDP, and the SBP lead to the same aggregate AoI under small, i.e., κ < 1.16.
This is because the TDP scheme always leads to one update while a small age sensitivity also
renders a small amount of total updates for the QBP and the SBP. Second, when κ is increased
to 1.16, there is a small decrease in aggregate AoI for the QBP and SBP schemes. This is due
to the fact that κ increases the number of updates K∗, as the destination becomes more sensitive
to the AoI. Third, as κ increases, we see that the AoI cost increases for both the NU scheme
and the TDP. However, the aggregate AoI cost for the TDP increases much slower than the NU
scheme while the AoI cost for the QBP and SBP schemes increases even slower. We observe
a similar trend for the payment gap, the profit gap, and the social cost gap between the TDP
and the QBP (SBP) increases as κ increases in Fig. 11(b). That is, the destination’s sensitivity
to the age increases the performance gaps between the optimal pricing schemes (the QBP and
the SBP) and the benchmarks (the TDP and the SBP).
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Fig. 12: Impacts of the discounted coefficient δ on (a) discounted profit and (b) discounted social cost.
C. Results for the Unpredictable Deadline Model
We now present numerical results for the unpredictable deadline model. Fig. 12 compares the
performances of the three pricing schemes under the discount coefficient δ to demonstrate how
the time discounting affects the performances of different pricing schemes. In Fig. 12(a), we
observe that the optimal SBP is more profitable than the optimal QBP and the suboptimal TDP, as
the optimal SBP is the optimal pricing scheme among all possible pricing schemes (Proposition
10). An interesting observation is that the TDP outperforms the QBP when δ < 0.97, and the
QBP outperforms the TDP when δ is large. Hence, different from the predictable deadline model,
the QBP does not always perform better than the TDP due to the time discounting. Moreover, as
δ decreases, the performance of the TDP performs closely to the SBP, which is consistent with
the result in Proposition 8 that the TDP is asymptotically surplus-extracting. More importantly, as
δ approaches 0.6, the TDP already performs very close to the SBP. This implies that a moderate
degree of time discounting is enough to make the TDP close-to-profit-maximizing.
In Fig. 12(b), we observe that the SBP achieves a smaller social cost compared against the QBP
and the TDP, as the surplus-extracting pricing scheme also achieves the minimal social cost by
Definition 12. An interesting observation is that all three pricing schemes perform more closely
to each other as δ decreases and achieve the discounted social cost with negligible differences
under a moderate level of time discounting δ (i.e. δ = 0.6).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the first pricing scheme design for fresh data trading and proposed three pricing
schemes to explore the profitability of exploiting different dimensions in designing pricing. Our
results revealed that (i) the profitability to exploit the time flexibility depends on the degree of
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time discounting; (ii) the optimal quantity-based pricing scheme achieves the maximal source’s
profit among all pricing schemes with a predictable deadline but not with an unpredictable dead-
line; (iii) the optimal low-complexity subscription-based pricing scheme achieves the maximal
source’s profit under both models.
Our insightful results shed light on pricing scheme design for a more general scenario: multi-
destination systems, which raise the challenges of coupling system constraints (e.g. interference
constraints). Another interesting direction is to study incomplete information settings, which
require to leverage mechanism design to elicit destinations’ truthful information regarding AoI.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
We prove Lemma 2 by contradiction. Suppose that pP,T
(∑k
j=1 x
P,T
j
)
> DF (xP,Tk+1, x
P,T
k ) as
by doing so leads to a strictly . The destination would prefer not to update at Sk, contradicting to
the fact that (pP,T(t), KP,T,xP,T) is an equilibrium. On the other hand, if pP,T
(∑k
j=1 x
P,T
j
)
<
DF (xP,Tk+1, x
P,T
k ), the source can always properly increase p
P,T
(∑k
j=1 x
P,T
j
)
to DF (xP,Tk+1, x
P,T
k ).
Such a price increase does not change the destination’s optimal solution (KP,T,xP,T), hence
increases the source’s profit. This contradicts the fact that (ΠP,Tt ,xP,T) is an equilibrium.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Given an equilibrium (p∗(t), K∗,x∗), we first prove that p∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
≤ DF (x∗k+1, x∗k, 0) for
all k ∈ K(K∗ + 1). The equilibrium destination’s overall cost (the aggregate AoI cost plus the
payment) is
K∗∑
k=1
F (x∗k) +
K∗+1∑
k=1
p∗
(
k∑
j=1
x∗j
)
. (60)
Suppose there exists an update l such that p∗
(∑l
j=1 x
∗
j
)
> DF (x∗l+1, x
∗
l , 0). Suppose that the
destination changes its update policy from S∗ to S∗/{S∗l } (i.e., removing the update at S∗l ), the
overall cost becomes
K∗∑
k=1,k /∈{l,l+1}
F (x∗k) + F (x
∗
l + x
∗
l+1) +
K∗+1∑
k=1,k 6=l
p∗
(
k∑
j=1
x∗j
)
. (61)
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Subtracting (61) by (60), we have
F (x∗l + x
∗
l+1)− F (x∗l )− F (x∗l+1)− p∗
(
l∑
j=1
x∗j
)
=DF (x∗l+1, x
∗
l , 0)− p∗
(
l∑
j=1
x∗j
)
< 0. (62)
This means that by removing the update at S∗l , the destination can reduce its overall cost,
contradicting with the fact that x∗ is at an equilibrium. Hence, we prove that p∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
≤
DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0) for all k ∈ K(K∗ + 1) at the equilibrium.
To prove p∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
≥ DF (x∗k+1, x∗k, 0) for all k ∈ K(K∗ + 1), we adopt the following
lemma:
Lemma 9. For any time-dependent pricing scheme p(t) leading to the destination’s update policy
S∗(p(t)), we can always construst another time-dependent pricing scheme p˜(t) given by
p˜(t) =
p(t), if t = Sk, ∀Sk ∈ S
∗(p(t)),
+∞, otherwise,
(63)
which leads to the same destination’s update policy, i.e., S∗(p˜(t)) = S∗(p(t)), and hence the
same source’s profit.
Proof: To see why both pricing scheme lead to the same destination’s update policy, suppose
that S∗(p(t)) 6= S∗(p˜(t)). We have that (i) under p˜(t), the update policy S∗(p˜(t)) leads to a
smaller destination’s overall cost; (ii) S∗(p˜(t)) ⊂ S∗(p(t)), since the infinitively large prices in
(63) make the destination unable to update at the time instances outside the set S∗(p(t)). Hence,
under both pricing schemes p(t) and p˜(t), S∗(p˜(t)) leads to the same destination’s overall cost
which is smaller than the overall cost incurred by S∗(p(t)). This contradicts with the fact that
S∗(p(t)) is the optimal update policy under p(t). Therefore, we must have S∗(p˜(t)) = S∗(p(t)).
We then prove p∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
≥ DF (x∗k+1, x∗k, 0) for all k ∈ K(K∗ + 1) by considering the
following lemma:
Lemma 10. For a time-dependent pricing
p(t)
≤ DF (x˜k+1, x˜k, 0), if t = S˜k, ∀S˜k ∈ S˜,= +∞, otherwise, (64)
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for some update policy S˜ = {S˜k}, we have S∗(p(t)) = S˜.
Proof: We prove the Lemma 10 by backward induction:
• Base case: Regardless of the destination’s all previous update candidate time instances
{S˜1, S˜2, ..., S˜K−1}, the minimal AoI at the time instance S˜K is x˜K . In this case, the minimal
aggregate AoI cost reduction is at DF (x˜K+1, x˜K , 0). Hence, when p(S˜K) ≤ DF (x˜K+1, x˜K , 0),
the destination would update at S˜K .7
• Induction Step: Suppose that the destination would update at {S˜j}k+1≤j≤K . Regardless of
the destination’s all previous update candidate time instances {S˜j}1≤j≤k−1, the minimal AoI
at the time instance S˜k is x˜k due to the pricing scheme in (64). In this case, the minimal
aggregate AoI cost reduction is at DF (x˜k+1, x˜k, 0). Hence, when p(S˜k) ≤ DF (x˜k+1, x˜k, 0),
the destination would update at S˜k, since it can reduce the overall cost (the aggregate AoI
cost plus the payment).
Hence, by the principle of induction, we complete the proof of Lemma 10.
According to Lemma 10, if there exists an equilibrium where the pricing scheme is p˜∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
<
DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0), the source can always increase p˜
∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
to DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0) to improve its
profit without changing the destination’s update policy, and hence improves its profit. This con-
tradicts with the fact that (p∗(t), K∗,x∗) is an equilibrium and hence we have p∗
(∑k
j=1 x
∗
j
)
≥
DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0) for all k ∈ K(K∗ + 1).
Combining the above discussions of two cases, we complete the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 6 implies that the destination’s payment is
K∗∑
k=1
DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0).
and the source’s achievable profit is
K∗∑
k=1
DF (x∗k+1, x
∗
k, 0)− C(K∗), (65)
for some equilibrium (K∗,x∗). Hence, the optimal value of problem (17) leads to the maximal
achievable profit for the source.
7Note that even if p(S˜K) = DF (x˜K+1, x˜K , 0), the destinationa still would update at S˜K due to Assumption ??.
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We next show that, given the optimal solution (Ko,xo) to problem (17), the following is an
optimal time-dependent pricing scheme:
p∗ (t) =
DF (x
o
k+1, x
o
k, 0), if t =
∑k
j=1 x
o
j , ∀k ∈ K(Ko + 1),
+∞, otherwise.
(66)
From Lemma 10, the under the pricing in (66), the destination’s update policy is (K∗,x∗) =
(Ko,xo). In this case, the source’s profit is the optimal value of problem (17). Combining this
and the argument that the optimal value of problem (17) leads to the maximal achievable profit
for the source, we show that the optimal solution (Ko,xo) to problem (17) leads to the optimal
time-dependent pricing scheme in (66).
D. Proof of Proposition 2
We first consider the following lemma:
Lemma 11. When the AoI cost function f(t) is convex, the aggregate differential AoI cost
function DF (·) satisfies, for all y ≥ z,
DF (x, y + a, y) ≥ DF (x, z + a, z). (67)
Proof: Consider the derivative of function DF (x, y + a, y).
∂DF (x, y + a, y)
∂y
=
∫ x
0
f ′(t+ y + a)dt−
∫ x
0
f ′(t+ y)dt. (68)
By the convexity of f(·), we have f ′(t+ y + a) ≥ f ′(t+ y). Hence, we have∫ x
0
f ′(t+ y + a)dt ≥
∫ x
0
f ′(t+ y)dt
=⇒ ∂DF (x, y + a, y)
∂y
≥ 0, (69)
which indicates that DF (x, y+a, y) is non-decreasing in y. Therefore, we complete the lemma.
In the following, we prove Proposition 2 by induction, showing that for an arbitrary time-
dependent pricing scheme yielding more than K > 1 updates, there always exists a pricing
scheme leading to a single-update equilibrium that is more profitable. The following example
illustrates this with a linear AoI cost function.
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• Base case: For arbitrary update intervals x = {x1, x2, x3}, the destination’s payment is
F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1 + x2, x2)− C(2). (70)
Consider a new update intervals {x˜k} such that
x′k =
x2, if k = 1,x1 + x3, if k = 2. (71)
The destination’s payment becomes
F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1 + x3)− F (x2)− C(1),
=F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1, 0)− C(1),
(a)
≥F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1 + x2, x2)− C(1), (72)
where (a) is due to Lemma 11. This means that for arbitrary pricing scheme leading to two
updates, there always exists another pricing scheme with one update that is strictly more
profitable.
• Induction step: Let K ≥ n and suppose that the statement is true for n = K, the source’s
profit is
F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1 + x2, x2) +
K∑
k=3
DF (xk+1, xk, 0)− C(K). (73)
Consider new update intervals x′k such that
x′k =

x2, if k = 1,
x1 + x3, if k = 2,
xk+1, otherwise.
(74)
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The source’s profit becomes
F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1 + x3)− F (x2)
+DF (x4, x3 + x1, x1) +
K∑
k=4
DF (xk+1, xk, 0)
− C(K − 1),
(b)
≥ F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1 + x3)− F (x2)
+DF (x4, x3, 0) +
K∑
k=4
DF (xk+1, xk, 0)− C(K − 1),
= F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1, 0) +
K∑
k=3
DF (xk+1, xk, 0)− C(K − 1),
(c)
≥ F (x1 + x2 + x3)− F (x1)− F (x2)− F (x3)
−DF (x3, x1 + x2, x2) +
K∑
k=3
DF (xk+1, xk, 0)
− C(K − 1), (75)
where (b) and (c) are due to Lemma 11. By comparing (75) and (73), we see that adopting
(74) strictly increases the source’s profit.
Based on induction, we can show that we can find a (K ′ − 1)-udpate policy would be more
profitable than the (K ′,x′) policy. This eventually leads to the conclusion that a single update
policy is the most profitable.
E. Proof of Corollary 1
By Theorems 1-??, problem (17) becomes
max
x∈[0,T ]
DF (T − x, x, 0) = max
x∈[0,T ]
[F (T )− F (x)− F (T − x)]. (76)
The necessary condition for optimality yields
f(xP,T) = f(T − xP,T), (77)
which indicates x∗ = T/2. Theorem 1 implies that the optimal price at T/2 is
p(T/2) = DF (T/2, T/2). (78)
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Notice that the aggregate AoI cost reduction by updating at T/2 is DF (T/2, T/2, 0) and is
DF (T − x, x, 0) at any other time instance x 6= T/2. In addition, the second-order derivative of
DF (T − x, x, 0) with respect to x is
∂2DF (T − x, x, 0)
∂x2
= −f ′(x)− f ′(T − x) < 0, (79)
which implies that DF (T − x, x, 0) is strictly convex in x. Therefore, DF (T − x, x, 0) <
DF (T/2, T/2, 0) for all other time instances x 6= T/2. Under the pricing scheme p(t) =
DF (T/2, T/2, 0) for all t ∈ T , the destination would only update at T/2, which completes
the proof.
F. Proof of Lemma 3
With K fixed, problem (19) is reduced to a convex problem. Since it is easy to verify that the
Slater’s condition is satisfied, the following KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient
for the optimality of the reduced problem:
F ′(xk) = f(xk) = Q, ∀k ∈ K(KP,Q + 1), (80a)
Q
(
K+1∑
k=1
xk − T
)
= 0, (80b)
where Q is the dual variable corresponding to constraint (19b). Combining (80a) and (80b), we
see that (20) is an optimal solution to (80a) and (80b). In addition, since f(xk) is an increasing
function and thus is one-to-one. This implies that (20) is the unique optimal solution to (80a)
and (80b). We complete the proof.
G. Proof of Proposition 3
We first prove (23) by considering the following two cases:
• Suppose that there exists an optimal solution to (21) such that
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k > F (T ) −
(KP,Q + 1)F (T/(KP,Q + 1)). In this case, the destination’s overall cost (the aggregate AoI
cost plus the payment) when given 0 update is Υ(0,ΠP,Qq ) = F (T ) while Υ(K
P,Q,ΠP,Qq ) =
(KP,Q+1)F (T/(KP,Q+1))+
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k . By the case condition, we have Υ(K
P,Q,ΠP,Qq ) >
Υ(0,ΠP,Qq ), violating the constraint that K
P,Q minimizes Υ(K,ΠP,Qq ). Hence, we must have∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q ≤ F (T )− (KP,Q + 1)F (T/(KP,Q + 1)).
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• Suppose that there exists an optimal solution to (21) such that
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k < F (T ) −
(KP,Q + 1)F (T/(KP,Q + 1)). In this case, there exists another quantity-based pricing p˜1
satisfying p˜1 > p
P,Q
1 , p˜k = p
P,Q
k for all remaining k > 1, and
KP,Q∑
k=1
p˜k ≤ F (T )− (KP,Q + 1)F
(
T
KP,Q + 1
)
. (81)
For the new pricing scheme Π˜P,Qq , the overall cost Υ(K
P,Q,ΠP,Qq ) is increased by the same
constant p˜1 − pP,Q1 for all positive K ′. Combining this with (81), we see that KP,Q still
satisfies the constraint that KP,Q minimizes the overall cost Υ(KP,Q,ΠP,Qq ) but the pricing
scheme Π˜q increases the source’s profit. This implies that (Π˜q, KP,Q,xP,Q) achieves a higher
profit than (ΠP,Qq , K
P,Q,xP,Q), which contradicts with the fact that (ΠP,Qq , K
P,Q,xP,Q) is
optimal to (21). Hence, we must have
∑KP,Q
k=1 p
P,Q
k ≥ F (T )− (KP,Q + 1)F (T/(KP,Q + 1)).
Combining the above discussions, we complete the proof for (23). To ensure that K∗ satisfies
constraint (21c), we see that K∗ must satisfy (24). We complete the proof.
H. Proof of Proposition 4
Let KP,Q be the optimal solution to problem (26). By the definition of Kˆ in (28), we have
Kˆ ≤ K∗ ≤ Kˆ + 1. The convexity of the objective in (26) implies that the objective of (26)
(which is also the objective of problem (25)) is non-decreasing in K for all K ≤ K∗ and is
non-increasing in K for all K ≥ KP,Q. This implies an optimal solution to problem (25) is
either Kˆ or Kˆ + 1.
I. Proof of Theorem 1
The social cost minimization problem in (10) is
min
K∈N,x∈X (K)
K+1∑
k=1
F (xk) + C(K),
(a)
= min
K∈N
(K + 1)F (T/(K + 1)) + C(K), (82)
where X (K) , {x : x ∈ RK+1++ ,
∑K+1
k=1 xk = T} and (a) is due to the similar reason in the
proof of Lemma 3. Specially, if we fix K, it is readily verified that the reduced problem (of
42
optimizing x) satisfies the Slater’s condition. Hence, the following KKT conditions are both
necessary and sufficient for the optimality of the reduced problem:
F ′(xk) = f(xk) = Q, ∀k ∈ K(K + 1) (83a)
λ
(
K+1∑
k=1
xk − T
)
= 0, (83b)
where λ is the dual variable corresponding to constraint (19b). By Definition 7 and Proposition
3, we see that the optimal quantity-based pricing ΠP,Q is surplus extracting. By Lemma 2, the
optimal quantity-based pricing scheme is optimal among all possible pricing schemes.
J. Proof of Theorem 1
Due to the payment structure, the payment from the destination is
P (S) =
K∑
k=1
p(Sk, k). (84)
For any pricing function p(k, t), the equilibrium destination’s overall cost is at least F (T ). This
is because for any arbitrary pricing scheme, the destination can refuse to request any update and
end up with an aggregate AoI cost F (T ) with zero payment. Hence, for any pricing scheme Π,
we have
P (S∗(Π)) ≤ F (T )− Γ(S∗(Π)). (85)
Hence, the source’s profit thus is
P (S∗(Π))− C(K∗(Π),
≤ F (T )− Γ(S∗(Π))− C(K∗(Π)),
≤ F (T )−min
S∈Φ
[Γ(S) + C(K)],
(a)
= F (T )−min
K∈N
[
F
(
T
K + 1
)
(K + 1) + C(K)
]
, (86)
where Φ is the set of all feasible update policies. Hence, (86) provides an upper bound for the
profit for arbitrary pricing scheme. The proof of (a) is similar to that of Lemma 3. Specifically,
given the optimal update count K∗, the optimal intervals are equal.
By Lemma 11, we observe that the optimal quantity-based pricing attains the upper bound, i.e.,
the payment F (T )− (K∗+ 1)F (T/(K∗+ 1)) minus the operational cost C(K∗). Therefore, the
optimal quantity-based already achieves the maximal profitability among all time-and-quantity
dependent pricing schemes.
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K. Proof of Lemma 5
By the individual rationality constraint in (36), we have
Pδ(So(Π),Π) ≤ Fδ(∞)− Γδ(So(Π)). (87)
Hence, the source’s profit thus is
Pδ(So(Π))− Cδ(Ko(Π)) ≤ Fδ(∞)− Γδ(S∗(Π))− Cδ(S∗(Π)),
≤ Fδ(∞)−minS∈Φ [Γδ(S) + Cδ(S)]. (88)
Hence, if the profit of a pricing scheme attains the upper bound in (88), it achieves the maximal
profit among all pricing schemes.
L. Proof of Proposition 6
Lemma 4 implies that
Vc =
Fδ(x
o) + δx
o
c(xo)
1− δxo , (89)
0 = f(xo) + ln(δ)c(xo) + c′(xo) + ln(δ)Vc. (90)
Combining (89) and (90), we have
Fδ(x
o)− 1
ln(δ−1)
(1− δx)f(x) = (1− δxo)c′(x)− c(x)
(a)
=⇒ 1
ln(δ)
∫ xo
0
(1− δt)f ′(t)dt = (1− δxo)c′(x)− c(x),
=⇒
∫ xo
0
(1− δt)f ′(t)dt = ln(δ−1)[c(x)− (1− δxo)c′(x)], (91)
where (a) is due to the fact that
∫ x
0
g(t)h′(t)dt = g(x)h(x) − ∫ x
0
g′(t)h(t)dt for all functions
g(x), h(x).
M. Proof of Proposition 7
First, we prove L(x,Q) is Lipschitz continuous and it is readily verified that the corresponding
Lipschitz continuous LL is given by LL , 4 maxt≥0[δtf(t)] + Lc +Q ln(δ−1). That is,
|L(x1, Q)− L(x2, Q)| ≤ LL|x1 − x2|, ∀x1, x2 ≥ 0. (92)
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Second, to show the optimal solution x?t ≤ x˜(Q), we substitute x¯ into the objective in (47),
which yields
L(x¯, Q) = −Q(1− δx). (93)
Note that
L(x,Q) ≤ δx
∫ x
0
δtf(x+ t)dt−Q(1− δx)
(a)
<
δxζx
ln((δζ)−1)
−Q(1− δx)
≤ [δ ·max(1, ζ)]x
(
1
ln((δζ)−1)
+Q
)
−Q. (94)
where (a) is due to Assumption 2. Combining (49), (93), and (94), we have
L(x,Q) ≤ L(x¯, Q) ≤ max
x′≥0
L(x′, Q), ∀x ≥ x˜(Q), (95)
which implies that, when Q is fixed, the optimal solution of L(x,Q) must live on [0, x˜(Q)].
N. Proof of Proposition 8
Let ζδ,t and ζ∗δ be the source’s profits under the equal spacing time-dependent pricing and a
surplus-extracting pricing, respectively. Let xo the socially optimal interarrival time.
ζδ,t
ζ∗δ
≥ Fδ(2x
o)− (1 + δxo)Fδ(xo)− δxoc(xo)
(1− δxo)Fδ(∞)− Fδ(xo)− c(xo)
≥ Fδ(x
o)− (1 + δxo)Fδ(xo)− δxoc(xo)
(1− δxo)Fδ(∞)− Fδ(xo)− c(xo)
Note that if limδ→0
A(δ)
B(δ)
→ 1 and limδ→0 C(δ)D(δ) → 1, then limδ→0 A(δ)+C(δ)B(δ)+D(δ) → 1. We start with
lemma:
Lemma 12. The following equation holds: limδ→0
∫ xo
0 δ
tf(t)dt∫∞
0 δ
tf(t)dt
= 1.
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Proof:
lim
δ→0
∫ xo
0
δtf(t)dt∫∞
0
δtf(t)dt
= lim
δ→0
∫ xo
0
δtf(t)dt∑∞
k=0 δ
kxo
∫ xo
0
δtf(t+ (k − 1)xo)dt
(a)
≥ lim
δ→0
δx¯f(x¯)xo
δx¯f(x¯)xo + δxo
∑∞
k=1(δζ)
(k−1)xo ∫ xo
0
A(δζ)tdt
(b)
≥ lim
δ→0
f(x¯)xo
f(x¯)xo + δxo−x¯A
∫ xo
0
γt−xodt
=1, (96)
where (a) is due to Assumption 2 that f(t) ≤ Aζt and due to the mean value theorem, there
exists a x¯ ∈ (0, xo) such that δx¯f(x¯)xo = ∫ xo
0
δtf(t)dt; (b) is due to that ζδ ≤ γ according to
Assumption 2.
We have that
lim
δ→0
ζδ,t
ζ∗δ
≥ lim
δ→0
Fδ(2x
o)− (1 + δxo)Fδ(xo)− δxoc(xo)
(1− δxo)Fδ(∞)− Fδ(xo)− c(xo) = limδ→0
∫ xo
0
δtf(t)dt∫∞
0
δtf(t)dt
= 1 (97)
O. Proof of Lemma 7
Taking the derivative of the destination’s objective in (38) with respect to Sk yields
δSk ln(δ)pk + δ
Sk−1fδ(Sk − Sk−1) + δSk ln(δ)Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk)− δSkfδ(Sk+1 − Sk) = 0, ∀k ∈ N,
(98)
ln(δ)pk + f(Sk − Sk−1) + ln(δ)Fδ(Sk+1 − Sk) = fδ(Sk+1 − Sk), ∀k ∈ N, (99)
For each k ∈ N, summing (99) over all j ≥ k leads to Lemma 7.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Shapiro and H. Varian, “Information rules: A strategic guide to the network economy.” Harvard Business Press, 1999.
[2] S. Kaul, R. D. Yates, and M. Gruteser, “Real-time status: How often should one update? in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2012.
[3] S. Liu, “Global IoT market size 2017-2025”, Oct., 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/976313/global-iot-market-size/.
[4] “Cloud Computing Market by Service Model (Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software
as a Service (SaaS)), Deployment Model (Public, Private, and Hybrid), Organization Size, Workload, Vertical, and Region
- Global Forecast to 2023”, 2019. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/cloud-computing-market-234.
[5] A. Bagh and H. K. Bhargava, “How to price discriminate when tariff size matters,” Mark. Sci., vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 111-126,
2013.
46
[6] https://cloud.google.com/apigee-api-management/
[7] https://cloud.google.com/maps-platform/
[8] https://rimuhosting.com
[9] Z. Huang, S. M. Weinberg, L. Zheng, C. Joe-Wong, and M. Chiang, “Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness
in a deadline-aware scheduler,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2007.
[10] Z. Huang, S. M. Weinberg, L. Zheng, C. Joe-Wong, and M. Chiang, “RUSH: A robust scheduler to manage uncertain
completion-times in shared clouds,” in Proc. IEEE ICDCS, 2016.
[11] C. Joe-Wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “Time-dependent broadband pricing: feasibility and benefits,” in Proc. ICDCS, 2011.
[12] P. Hande, M. Chiang, R. Calderbank, and J. Zhang, “Pricing under constraints in access networks: Revenue maximization
and congestion management,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2010.
[13] L. Zhang, W. Wu, and D. Wang, “Time dependent pricing in wireless data networks: Flat-rate vs. usage-based schemes,”
in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2014.
[14] L. Jiang, S. Parekh, and J. Walrand, “Time-dependent network pricing and bandwidth trading,” in Proc. IEEE NOMS,
2008.
[15] S. Ha, S. Sen, C. Joe-Wong, Y. Im, and M. Chiang, “TUBE: Time-dependent pricing for mobile data.” SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev, 2012.
[16] Q. Ma, Y.-F. Liu, and J. Huang,“Time and location aware mobile data pricing.” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., 2016.
[17] A. Sundararajan, “Nonlinear pricing of information goods,” Manage. Sci, 2004.
[18] H. Shen and T. Basar, “Optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolistic network service provider with complete and incomplete
Information,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2007.
[19] S. Li and J. Huang, “Price differentiation for communication networks,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 2014.
[20] R. L. Phillips, “Pricing and revenue optimization.” Stanford University Press, 2005.
[21] Q. He, D. Yuan, and A. Ephremides, “Optimal link scheduling for age minimization in wireless systems”. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, 2018.
[22] Q. He, D. Yuan, and A. Ephremides, “On optimal link scheduling with min-max peak age of information in wireless
systems, in Proc. IEEE ICC, 2016.
[23] I. Kadota, E. Uysal-Biyikoglu, R. Singh, and E. Modiano, “Minimizing the age of information in broadcast wireless
networks, in Proc. IEEE Allerton, 2016.
[24] C. Kam, S. Kompella, and A. Ephremides, Age of information under random updates, in Proc. IEEE ISIT, 2013.
[25] Y. Sun, E. Uysal-Biyikoglu, R. D. Yates, C. E. Koksal, and N. B. Shroff, “Update or wait: How to keep your data fresh,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2017.
[26] A. M. Bedewy, Y. Sun, S. Kompella, N. B. Shroff, “Optimal Sampling and Scheduling for Timely Status Updates in
Multi-source Networks,” available online: arXiv:2001.09863.
[27] R. Talak, S. Karaman, and E. Modiano. “Optimizing information freshness in wireless networks under general interference
constraints,” in Proc. ACM Mobihoc, 2018.
[28] I. Kadota, A. Sinha, and E. Modiano. “Optimizing age of information in wireless networks with throughput constraints,”
in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2018.
[29] R. D. Yates, “Lazy is timely: Status updates by an energy harvesting source,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT, 2015.
[30] X. Wu, J. Yang, and J. Wu, “Optimal Status Update for Age of Information Minimization with an Energy Harvesting
Source,” IEEE Trans. on Green Commun. Netw., vol. 2, no.1, pp. 193204, March 2018.
[31] A. Arafa, J. Yang, S. Ulukus, and H. V. Poor, “Age-minimal transmission for energy harvesting sensors with finite batteries:
Online policies”, IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 534-556, Jan. 2020.
47
[32] B. T. Bacinoglu, Y. Sun, E. Uysal-Biyikoglu, and V. Mutlu. “Achieving the age-energy tradeoff with a finite-battery energy
harvesting source,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT, 2018.
[33] A. Arafa and S. Ulukus, “Timely Updates in Energy Harvesting Two-hop Networks: Offline and Online Policies,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 4017-4030, 2019.
[34] B. Zhou and W. Saad, “Optimal Sampling and Updating for Minimizing Age of Information in the Internet of Things”,
in Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, 2018.
[35] M. A. Abd-Elmagid, N. Pappas, and H. S. Dhillon, “On the Role of Age-of-Information in Internet of Things”, available
online: arXiv:1812.08286.
[36] G. D. Nguyen, S. Kompella, C. Kam, J. E. Wieselthier, and A. Ephremides, “Impact of hostile interference on information
freshness: A game approach,” in Proc. WiOpt, 2017.
[37] G. D. Nguyen, S. Kompella, C. Kam, J. E. Wieselthier, and A. Ephremides, “Information freshness over an interference
channel: A game theoretic view,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2018.
[38] Y. Xiao and Y. Sun, “A dynamic jamming game for real-time status updates” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM Age of Information
Workshop, 2018.
[39] X. Wang and L. Duan, “Dynamic pricing for controlling age of information,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT, 2019.
[40] S. Hao and L. Duan, “Regulating competition in age of information under network externalities,” to appear in IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications.
[41] B. Li, and J. Liu, “Can we achieve fresh information with selfish users in mobile crowd-learning?” in Proc. WiOpt, 2019.
[42] S. Sen, C. Joe-Wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “A survey of smart data pricing: Past proposals, current plans, and future
trends.” ACM Computing Surveys, 2013.
[43] S. Sen, C. Joe-Wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “Incentivizing time-shifting of data: a survey of time-dependent pricing for
internet access,” IEEE Commun. Magazine, 2012.
[44] S. Frederick, G. Loewenstein, T. O’donoghue, “Time discounting and time preference: A critical review” Journal of
Economic Literature, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 351401, 2002.
[45] A. Even and G. Shankaranarayanan, “Utility-driven assessment of data quality” SIGMIS Database, 2007.
[46] S. Shalev-Shwartz, “Online learning and online convex optimization, Found. Trends Mach. Learn., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 107194,
2012.
[47] X. He et al., “Practical lessons from predicting clicks on ads at Facebook,” in Proc. 8th Int. Workshop Data Mining Online
Advertising, 2014, pp. 19.
[48] Brucker, P. and Krmer, A., 1996. “Polynomial algorithms for resource-constrained and multiprocessor task scheduling
problems.” European Journal of Operational Research, 90(2), pp.214-226.
[49] Manimaran, G. and Murthy, C.S.R., 1998. “An efficient dynamic scheduling algorithm for multiprocessor real-time systems.”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 9(3), pp.312-319.
[50] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, “Microeconomic theory” Oxford university press, 1995.
[51] B. Colson, P. Marcotte, and G. Savard, “An overview of bilevel optimization, Ann. Operations Res., 2007.
[52] W. Dinkelbach, “On nonlinear fractional programming,” Management Science, 13(7), pp.492-498, 1967.
